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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS ADDRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, PROPER APPELLATE PROCEDURES FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONNEL 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUALS IN THE CASE OF BERUBE 
V. FASHION CENTRE, LTD., 771 P.2d 1033 (UTAH 1989), 
WHICH SHOULD BE CONTROLLING IN THIS PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
In the case of Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989), the Supreme Court addressed many significant 
issues; three issues pertain to the case at hand: statutory 
construction, appellate review of summary judgment, and the 
impact of a policy and procedure manual. The Berube Case, 
supra, involved a private employee instead of a public employee; 
nevertheless, the principals are pertinent hereto. 
In the Berube decision at 77 P.2d 1038 this Court stated: 
The rulings of a trial court regarding statutory 
construction are not entitled to particular deference. 
Betenson v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 
684, 685-86 (Utah 1982). In analyzing Section 
34-37-16, we are guided by the rule that in the absence 
of an ambiguity, a statute should be construed 
according to its plain language. See Johnson v. State 
Retirement Office, 755 P.2d 161 [sic]; State v. 
Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (Utah 1974). Although 
legislative intent is important, see Osuala v. Aetna 
Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980), the 
best indication of legislative intent is the statutes 
plain language. Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). 
In light of this guidance by the Supreme Court, it is obvious 
that the Court of Appeals and the Trial Court should have 
reviewed the statutes pertaining to Appellant in a manner 
consistent not only with the stated legislative intent but also 
with the statute's plain language. Therefore, in regards to the 
statutory rights of appeal of Appellant and also the violation 
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of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, this Court should 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
The Berube Case, at 77 P.2d 1039, also addresses the 
appellate requirements to review a summary judgment. 
In reviewing a summary judgment, we liberally construe 
all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in 
favor of the party opposing the motion. Payne ex rel, 
Payne v. Meyers, 743 P«2d 186 (Utah 1987); Oberhansly 
v. Sprousef 751 P.2d 1155 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We are 
free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank# 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
The Court of Appeals erred by utilizing the Respondents' facts 
to review the Summary Judgment. 
The third issue which is of significance herein is the 
emphasis that the Berube Case, supra, placed upon the importance 
of a policy and procedure manual. The case makes it clear that 
an employer is expected to abide by the terms of a policy 
manual. Associate Chief Justice Howe's concurring opinion (with 
which Chief Justice Hall concurred) states at page 1050: 
I concur only in the results in parts IV and V deeming it 
not necessary or appropriate here to go beyond the written 
policy manual of the employer, which I view as being part of 
the total employment contract. 
At page 1052 Justice Zimmerman in his (concurring in the result) 
opinion stated: 
In this context, the representations made by the employer in 
employee manuals, bulletins, and the like are legitimate 
sources for determining the apparent intentions of the 
parties. 
In the case at hand, Richfield City had enacted the Richfield 
City Police Department Policies and Procedures Manual which 
specifically allowed for appeals of termination. Thus, this is 
further support for this Court to reverse the decision. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS RELIED UPON THE FACTS SET FORTH 
BY THE RESPONDENTS IN ITS RULING AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS AND TOTALLY 
DISREGARDED THE STIPULATED FACTS WHICH WERE BINDING 
UPON BOTH THE PARTIES AND THE COURT 
The Respondents, in support of their Motion For Summary 
Judgment submitted several affidavits. Of particular importance 
are facts from the affidavits of defendants Harwood and 
Farnsworth. In the Court Record at page 229 Harwood stated: 
All media representatives were asked if they wanted to be 
notified if open session resumed. All responded in words or 
to the effect that "We do not necessarily want to return but 
if action is takenf advise us what action the Council 
takes." 
In the Court Record at page 238 Farnsworth made the exact same 
statement. The above statement is extremely significant when 
compared with footnote one of the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Footnote one states: 
1. Prior to the closed session the Council asked if anyone 
present wanted to be notified if open session resumed. Most 
of those present were members of the media and they 
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, 
but wanted to be advised if action was taken. 
It is obvious that footnote one was obtained by the Court of 
Appeals from the facts as set forth by the Respondents. 
At pages 277 to 279 of the Court Record is the affidavit of 
Kent Colby, a media member who was present at the council 
meeting. The affidavit of Colby was submitted in opposition to 
the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. In the interest 
of space the affidavit is not set forth here. Nevertheless, the 
affidavit of Colby creates issues of material facts because it 
directly opposes the facts of the Respondents. 
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However# controlling herein are the facts which were 
stipulated to by the parties in open court. Fact number four as 
set forth in the Appellant's Petition herein states as follows: 
4. Kent Colby, the representative of KSVC radio station, 
who was a member of the public present at the Council 
meeting when Richfield went into the closed meeting, 
requested that he be contacted so that he could be present 
if Richfield went back into open meeting to transact any 
further business (Record pages 48, 49). 
Obviously, the stipulated facts are not only binding upon the 
parties but are binding upon the Court as well. Therefore, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it 
erred in reviewing the summary judgment. 
III. THE APPELLANTS INCLUSION OF THE RICHFIELD CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL IN THE 
APPEAL IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The Respondents have stated that the Richfield City Police 
Department Policies and Procedures Manual was not properly 
entered before the Trial Court. However, an evaluation of the 
Court Record establishes just the opposite. In the Appellant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Appellant specifically addressed the Richfield City Police 
Department Policies and Procedures Manual and attached as 
Exhibit D to that Memorandum minutes of the January 8, 1981, 
Richfield City Council meeting in which the policies and 
procedures manual was both ratified and amended (Court Record, 
pages 315, 316 and 328 to 337). 
Appellant in his written request for an appeal of his 
termination made particular reference to "policies and procedure 
A 
or State of Ut&h laws" (Record page 337). Thus, the policies 
and procedures manual was adequately placed into the record and 
is appropriately before this Court. Moreover, this Court can 
take judicial notice of the policies and procedures manual as it 
can any ordinance or resolution enacted by a public body. 
In summary, the Supreme Court should grant the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari and reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals is in opposition 
to many decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, and the Court of 
Appeals clearly erred in its review of the Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 day of October, 1989. 
George W. Brown/Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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